

SAVA 73-164

16 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[redacted]  
Chief, Vietnam Operations

STAT

SUBJECT : D. Gareth Porter's 20 July Letter to  
Ray Cline

STAT

1. [redacted] asked me some time ago to take a look at Gareth Porter's 20 July letter to Ray Cline. As you probably know, Porter is a very ardent "revisionist" wedded to the theory that the North Vietnamese are incapable of error and the South Vietnamese of good. He has published a fair bit of material in this vein, particularly a strident defense of the Lao Dong's land reform programs of 1953-1956 incorporating a vicious attack on Hoang Van Chi and the latter's excellent book on this subject entitled "From Colonialism to Communism."

2. As for Porter's actual letter, I have no way of knowing whether Dr. Tuyen has in fact admitted that a document published on page 57 of State's February 1965 White Paper is a fabrication. I certainly have no personal recollection of admitting to anyone that it was a fabrication (which it may well have been) and indeed have no recollection of discussing this particular document with anyone.

3. It would seem to me that Cline's reply ought not to be pitched to defending that particular document or to retracting the argument of the 1965 paper if that document should indeed be a fabrication. Porter is turning a disingenuously blind eye to the fact that the case for the thesis that the Lao Dong Party controls the PRP -- and, indeed, that the latter is simply the former's southern branch or the name the Lao Dong uses south of the 17th Parallel -- does not rest on one document of debatable authenticity.

4. The case for the above analysis of the relationship between the Lao Dong and the PRP rests, instead, on a solid and well nigh overwhelming base of evidence it would be hard for any open-minded scholar to assail: captured documents, prisoner/rallier/agent testimony, radio communications patterns and even published Vietnamese Communist statements. Appended hereto is an illustrative sampling of this body of evidence, pulled together by my colleague

STAT

5. I hope the above and this attachment helps you answer Cline and apologize for taking such a long time to respond to your request.



STAT

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/mee  
Orig - Addressee w/att  
1 - GAC Chrono w/att ✓  
1 - VAS Chrono w/att

SAMPLING OF STATEMENTS INDICATING THAT THE LAO DONG PARTY IS THE SOLE COMMUNIST PARTY IN VIETNAM, THUS IMPLYING THAT THE PRP IS THE SOUTHERN BRANCH OF THAT PARTY

## I. NOTEWORTHY PUBLIC STATEMENTS

1. The FBIS Asia and Pacific Daily Reports of 11 March 1970 (p 1-4) and 24 March (p L 10) contain a monitored Liberation Radio broadcast of a speech delivered by an unidentified official of the PRP Central Committee who said the following:

"Dear Comrades, the success of the South Vietnamese revolution has been the success of the Party's correct line under the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Ho."

2. Another equally as candid remark was made by Truong Chinh in a 28 September 1967 interview with an Akahata correspondent. Truong Chinh told the correspondent:

"All the Vietnamese people are strongly united and firmly organized into national united fronts -- the Fatherland Front in North Vietnam and the NFLSV in South Vietnam. These two fronts are based upon the alliance of workers and farmers and are led by the Party of Marxism-Leninism." (See Akahata, 5 October 1967, p 3, cited in FBIS Asia and Pacific Daily Report of 9 October 1967, pp jjj 6-7.)

## II. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

1. Two months before the formal surfacing of the PRP in December 1961, a draft resolution of the first COSVN conference in October 1961 noted the following:

"A significant characteristic of the South Vietnam revolution is that it is under the leadership of our Party, a Marxist-Leninist party, which has undergone trials throughout a long, severe and fierce struggle against imperialism and feudalism that has been waged politically and militarily, legally and illegally. It has gained many

experiences and has installations everywhere along with an army of cadres who have matured throughout the many movements. Moreover, the Party is the unique symbol of leadership and has absolute prestige among the population."

2. A situation report on the status of the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam for 1954 to 1963 noted:

"During the past nine years, under the enlightened leadership of the Party Central Committee, the people and Party apparatus of South Vietnam have experienced many phases along the difficult and complicated path of struggle but they have also gained many victories and experiences while pushing the South Vietnam liberation revolution and creating the conditions for peaceful reunification of the country."

3. A COSVN Standing Committee directive discussing the tasks in the south for the last six months of 1963 said:

"The meeting of the Central Office Standing Committee during the last few days of July and the first part of August 1963 assessed, on the basis of the Political Bureau's resolution of December 1962, the situation between the enemy and ourselves during the months since the first part of this year and set forth a number of tasks during the coming months in order to achieve the missions of the Political Bureau's resolution."

4. The Political Bureau of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee in a resolution of early November 1963 said the following:

"The resolution of the 15th Central Committee conference clearly outlined the revolutionary road of South Vietnam and the methods of struggle to attain victory. The 1961 and 1962 Political Bureau resolutions outlined the struggle courses and specific policies aimed at resisting the effectiveness of the U.S. imperialist aggression since it became a "special" war. Resolutions of the Central Office of South Vietnam have substantiated and developed the resolution of the 15th Central Committee conference and the victories of the South Vietnamese compatriots have proven that the above resolutions of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Central Office are completely correct."

"Through struggling against imperialism and especially U.S. imperialists in the world arena and in South Vietnam at the present time, we more clearly recognize the disciplined nature of the enemy's policy aims. This assists us in more clearly recognizing the scientific basis of our policies and aims against the enemy and increases our confidence in the accuracy of these policies and aims. Therefore, based on the resolution of the 15th Central conference, the resolutions of the Political Bureau in 1961 and 1962, the development of the world and national situation, and the development of the South Vietnamese people's struggle during the past few years, especially during the last two years, this resolution of the Political Bureau clearly states additional basic decisions concerning the expectations of the South Vietnam revolutionary movement and our struggle aims and outlines a course and mission for advancing to new greater victories in the near future."

5. The Lao Dong Party Central Committee in its 9th plenum resolution of December 1963 said:

"The resolution of the 15th Central Committee conference (January 1959) and afterwards the resolution of the Third National Party Congress clearly outlined the road of South Vietnam resolution and the struggle course to attain victory. The resolutions of the Political Bureau in 1961 and 1962 clearly outlined the struggle guidelines and specific policies aimed at effectively resisting the U.S. armed aggression. The resolutions of the Central Office of South Vietnam have substantiated and developed the overall resolutions of the Party on the South Vietnam revolution. The victories of the South Vietnamese compatriots during the past few years prove that these resolutions of the Party have been entirely correct."

6. COSVN Resolution 2 of late 1963 or early 1964 noted the following:

"Experiences gained in these hard-fought achievements also helped the South Vietnam Party organization mature quickly in every respect. Under the Central Committee's leadership, the first COSVN conference in October 1961 set forth correct policy

guidelines and recapitulated all experiences in order to provide guidance for the future."

7. A COSVN Standing Committee account of the situation in South Vietnam from the end of 1961 to the beginning of 1964 said:

"The South Vietnam revolutionary movement still had many shortcomings until the end of 1961, but with the correct line of the Party Central Committee and the resolute struggle spirit of the army, people, cadres and Party members in South Vietnam, we have waged a protracted and total patriotic war of all the people."

"We must clearly recognize the enemy's new schemes and our shortcomings, strive to highly develop our strong points and victories, not become complacent or satisfied and also not become timid and afraid of difficulties and hardships, wholeheartedly oppose rightism and passivism, strive to rapidly build and strengthen the revolutionary forces, thoroughly develop the position of continuously attacking, and fully carry out the missions set forth by the Party Central Committee."

8. General Nguyen Chi Thanh in a 20 November 1964 speech said the following:

"The revolution in South Vietnam over the past several years has developed very well under the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh and by the Central Office."

9. COSVN Resolution 3 of January 1965 noted:

"Under the clear-sighted leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade X (Ho Chi Minh), and under the guidance of the Central Office and the various echelons, we are determined to mobilize and organize truly well all revolutionary forces in South Vietnam in order to brilliantly achieve all the urgent tasks which have been stated in the resolution of this conference of the Central Office."

10. A draft report on the situation in rural South Vietnam was presented at the third COSVN conference in January 1965 noting:

"During the past ten years, due to the correct leadership of the Central Committee and the Central Office, and due to the efforts of all Party organization echelons, cadres and Party members, and especially due to the indomitable struggle spirit of the working peasants in South Vietnam in resolutely and unceasingly resisting the U.S. imperialists, the feudal landlord puppet administration and the lackey reactionary comprador bourgeoisie to win back their lands and protect the Party, great victories have been won in the land revolution."

11. COSVN Resolution 4 of March 1966 noted:

"The realities of our recent victories increasingly illuminate the factors deciding our final victory. We have the correct domestic and foreign policies of a Marxist-Leninist party and an enlightened Party Central Committee strong both in revolutionary theory and experience, and which is led by Chairman Ho."

<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE
TO: <i>G. Carver</i>		
ROOM NO. <i>6F19</i>	BUILDING <i>Hqs</i>	
REMARKS: <i>I believe this is self explanatory. As we have been instructed to reply, we are on the hook for same. However, I thought you'd best see this first and perhaps can shed light on this and what, if anything, we should say in any reply.</i>		
FROM:	<i>EA/VNO</i>	
ROOM NO. <i>5D0111</i>	BUILDING <i>Hqs</i>	EXTENSION <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 20px;"></div>
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.		

STAT

STAT



STAT

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800110005-3

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800110005-3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE REFERENCE SLIP				DATE 7/25/73		
TO:	Name or Title	Organ. Symbol	Room No.	Bldg.	Initials	Date
1.	Mr. Theodore G. Shackley	CIA	5D3107			
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
Approval		Initial for Clearance		Per Conversation		
As Requested		Necessary Action		Prepare Reply		
Comment		Note and Forward		See Me		
For Your Information		Note and Return		Signature		
REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING						
<p><b>SUBJECT:</b> Letter from D. Gareth Porter</p> <p>We are now trying to frame a reply to this letter concerning an allegedly forged document which appeared in the Department's February 1965 White Paper.</p> <p>Do you have any interest which will require protection? Even if you do not, I would appreciate your views on the matter.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>CONFIDENTIAL</u></p>						
FROM: (Name and Org. Symbol)			ROOM NO. & BLDG.		PHONE NO.	
INR/DDC:RK			6635/NS			

FORM 2-64 DS-10

★ GPO : 1968 O - 202-217 (204)

From the Desk of Ray S. Cline (1)

Action: { REA - Fact  
          { ODC - Policy

24 July 1973

PROJECT ON THE  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF EAST ASIA

XXXXXXXXXXXX

July 20, 1973

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
2033 F Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. :

Mr. Ray Cline  
Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Cline:

I am writing to you about the question of the authenticity of one of documents cited by the Department of State in its February 1965 White Paper "Aggression from the North", which is now said by a former high Saigon government official to be a fake. I am referring to document on page 57 of that publication, under the title "The People's Revolutionary Party (South) and the Lao Dong Party (North) are One Communist Party", as Appendix G to the White Paper. This is a document allegedly captured in May 1962 by GVN troops in Ba Xuyen province and then allegedly turned over to the International Control Commission.

I am informed by an acquaintance who has interviewed Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, who was then in charge of the Saigon secret police and counterintelligence services, that Dr. Tuyen has now admitted that this was a fake document, written in his own office--and not a very good one at that. The language of the document itself certainly supports such a conclusion, and the document has long been suspect in the eyes of some Vietnamese specialists. I am further informed that Mr. George Carver also now admits privately that this was indeed a fake.

Since I am now writing a study on "captured Communist documents" and the problem of authentication, I would like to have official confirmation of this apparent forgery. If in fact the U.S. government now knows that one of the documents it has put forward as historical evidence is false, it has the responsibility for admitting the original mistake publicly, so that scholars are not misled any longer on the matter. I would appreciate, therefore, a reply at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

*D. Gareth Porter*  
D. Gareth Porter  
Research Associate